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INTRODUCTION

Courts in the United States wield enormous power over other
American institutions. In recent years, federal judges have used this
power to decree, often with the consent of the parties, extensive structural reform in such diverse areas as employment practices, prison
conditions, environmental cleanup, and the treatment of mentally ill
or retarded persons.' These court orders often affect the daily lives of
ordinary citizens, provoking heated debate and passionate rhetoric
within the community, ranging from claims that federal courts carry
the moral mandate of the Almighty to angry cries that unelected federal judges are ruining local institutions.2 Critics and advocates of
* Professor of Law, The University of Akron School of Law.
1. See, e.g., Citizens for a Better Env't v. Gorsuch, 718 F.2d 1117 (D.C. Cir. 1983), cert.
denied, 467 U.S. 1219 (1984) (environmental regulation); Duran v. Elrod, 713 F.2d 292 (7th
Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 465 U.S. 1108 (1984) (prison conditions); Brewster v. Dukakis, 687
F.2d 495 (1st Cir. 1982) (treatment of mentally ill persons); Equal Employment Opportunity
Comm'n v. American Tel. & Tel. Co., 419 F. Supp. 1022 (E.D. Pa. 1976), aff'd, 556 F.2d 167
(3d Cir. 1977) (employment practices).
2. In his powerful story of urban American life as exemplified in the Boston school
desegregation case of Morgan v. Hennigan, 379 F. Supp. 410 (D. Mass.), aff'd, Morgan v.
Kerrigan, 509 F.2d 580 (1st Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 421 U.S. 963 (1975), author J. Anthony
Lukas observes that black civil rights leaders described the federal judiciary as the great
champion of justice for black people, and indeed the voice of God. J.A. LUKAS, COMMON
GROUND 222-23 (1985). Lukas also recounts the bitter criticism directed by white opponents
of school busing at the presiding judge in the Boston case, Judge W. Arthur Garrity. Id. at
244-45.
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such consent decrees agree, however, on one point: Judges are
powerful.
A consent decree is a written agreement executed by the parties
to a civil suit and approved by the court. It serves as a procedural
device by which a judge can exert considerable power to achieve
structural reform. Consent decrees have become widely used over the
past thirty years as a means of settling litigation.4 The relief sought in
such litigation is usually complex, requiring improvement of conditions in large institutions and changes in bureaucratic policies. The
many advantages of settling such cases have often led to the negotiation of consent decrees.
Once the court has approved a consent decree, the parties must
implement its requirements. The process of implementation usually
takes place over a period of years because the provisions of a structural reform decree are numerous and comprehensive. 5 The court
typically retains jurisdiction of the case to supervise implementation
of the settlement, enforce compliance with its terms, and modify the
requirements when necessary.6 Although the decree itself usually
contains an express provision by which the court retains jurisdiction,
the court has inherent authority to enforce its decree without such a
clause.' This retained jurisdiction enables the judge to bring to bear
3. For a discussion of the nature of a consent decree and the role of the courts in deciding
whether to approve the parties' agreement, see Anderson, The Approval and Interpretation of
Consent Decrees in Civil Rights Class Action Litigation, 1983 U. ILL. L. REV. 579, 579-615.
4. Local Number 93, Int'l Ass'n of Firefighters v. City of Cleveland, 106 S. Ct. 3063,
3076 n.13 (1986).
5. For a discussion of the process of implementing consent decrees, see Anderson,
Implementation of Consent Decrees in Structural Reform Litigation, 1986 U. ILL. L. REV. 725.
6. In Raney v. Board of Education, 391 U.S. 443 (1968), the Supreme Court stated:
In light of the complexities inhering in the disestablishment of state-established
segregated school systems, Brown II contemplated that the better course would
be to retain jurisdiction until it is clear that disestablishment has been achieved.
We agree with the observation of another panel ofjudges of the Court of Appeals
for the Eighth Circuit in another case that the district courts "should retain
jurisdiction in school segregation cases to insure (1) that a constitutionally
acceptable plan is adopted, and (2) that it is operated in a constitutionally
permissible fashion so that the goal of a desegregated, non-racially operated
school system is rapidly and finally achieved."
Id. at 449 (quoting Kelley v. Altheimer, 378 F.2d 483, 489 (8th Cir. 1967)). Raney was a fully
litigated case not involving a consent decree, but the rationale for retaining jurisdiction-the
complexity of implementing the court's order-is the same in either type of case. For further
discussion of the similarities between litigated decrees and consent decrees with respect to the
issue of retaining and releasing jurisdiction, see infra text accompanying notes 16-19. See also
Burks v. Teasdale, 603 F.2d 59, 62-63 (8th Cir. 1979) (district court correct in retaining jurisdiction until it was satified that unconstitutionalities were-or would soon be-eliminated).
7. Sarabia v. Toledo Police Patrolman's Ass'n, 601 F.2d 914, 917 (6th Cir. 1979);
Stanwood v. Green, 559 F. Supp. 196, 199 (D. Or. 1983), aff'd, 744 F.2d 714 (9th Cir. 1984).

1987]

JURISDICTION OVER CONSENT DECREES

all the traditional powers of his office, including the power to issue
contempt orders and injunctions upon entrenched institutions and
bureaucracies.
Yet not even Jarndyce and JarndyceI lasted forever, and neither
will retention of jurisdiction over a consent decree. 9 Hopefully, at
some point in time, the parties will agree that the goals of the decree
have been met and will jointly petition the court to release its jurisdiction. The parties might disagree, however, as to whether the defendants have complied with the decree. In such cases, the defendants will
often move to release jurisdiction. In the next several years, as the
structural reform consent decrees of the past few decades enter middle age, the issue of the release of jurisdiction will likely arise with
increasing frequency.
Thus a judge engaged in the task of implementing complex
changes will eventually be faced with the difficult question of whether
to end his supervision of the decree. This question involves deep considerations concerning the outer limits of judicial power. It also takes
on larger proportions in the courts' conflict between idealism and
moral dictates on the one hand and pragmatic recognition of reality
on the other. The judge cannot demand perfect compliance with the
decree because such an achievement is impossible; nor can he permit
hostile opposition to the decree to frustrate his attempt to implement
its provisions. The heart of the problem facing the judge, therefore, is
whether he has done all he can within his power to order change by
decree. 1o
This article will explore the outer limits of judicial power in this
context and suggest standards that courts should use in deciding
whether to release jurisdiction over the implementation of consent
decrees. In structural reform litigation, courts have the duty and
authority to assure maximum compliance with the promises contained in a consent decree. A judge may find, however, that his role
in mandating reform is complete, and that further involvement will
8. C.

DICKENS, BLEAK HOUSE,

at viii, 525-43 (Signet Classic ed. 1964) (1853). The

fictitious case of Jarndyce and Jarndyce concerned a struggle to inherit a sizable estate. The
litigation continued for many years and only terminated when the assets of the estate had been
exhausted to pay court costs and attorney's fees, leaving the heirs with nothing.
9. See Pasadena City Bd. of Educ. v. Spangler, 427 U.S. 424, 435 (1976) (school board
entitled to formal relief from trial judge's order that there be "no majority of any minority" at
any school in the district).
10. See, e.g., Kendrick v. Bland, 659 F. Supp. 1188 (W.D. Ky. 1987). In Kendrick, prison
inmates contended that those in protective custody should be housed in a facility separate from
the general prison population because of great animosity between the two groups. The court,
however, while recognizing the animosity, concluded that the problem was administrative in
nature and was therefore best handled by the prison authorities. Id. at 1195-96.
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trap him in administrative detail. In such a case, the judge should
release jurisdiction if the defendant has substantially complied with
the decree, and if there is no reasonable likelihood that the defendant
will violate the decree in the future. These standards are designed to
achieve completion of the reforms without exceeding the limits of
judicial power.
Even if a court has released jurisdiction, however, an institution
such as a prison or mental hospital will continue to operate, and thus
the obligation to comply with the decree will also continue. It is
important to understand that the primary practical effect of releasing
jurisdiction is to end the court's active supervision, not to dissolve the
court decree itself." If the plaintiffs then claim that the defendant is
no longer complying with the decree, the court must decide whether
to resume its supervisory jurisdiction. This article will explore this
issue and suggest that courts should resume jurisdiction only if the
plaintiffs prove that the defendant has committed substantial violations of the decree or that there is a strong likelihood that such violations are about to occur.

II.

RELEASE OF JURISDICTION

Once a court has approved an agreement and has entered a consent decree, it has jurisdiction to supervise the implementation. 2
This jurisdiction is created by law and therefore exists regardless of
whether the decree contains a clause expressly retaining jurisdiction.
The parties nevertheless may include such a clause. Even a provision
limiting the court's jurisdiction to a specified period of time is valid if
the parties have bargained for the provision in good faith, and the
district judge approves the decree; but the court must then release
jurisdiction upon expiration of the specified time.' 3 Conversely, if
such a clause does not limit the court's jurisdiction to a certain period
of time, or if the decree lacks a jurisdiction clause, then the court
retains jurisdiction until, in its discretion, it decides to release it.' 4
There are few reported cases that set standards for courts to fol11. See infra text accompanying notes 46-50.
12. See United States v. Swift & Co., 286 U.S. 106, 114 (1932) (acknowledging that a
consent decree, like an injunction, carries with it continuing equity jurisdiction); see also
System Fed'n No. 91 v. Wright, 364 U.S. 642, 647 (1961) ("[A]n injunction often requires
continuing supervision by the issuing court and always a continuing willingness to apply its
powers and processes on behalf of the party who obtained that equitable relief.").
13. South v. Rowe, 759 F.2d 610, 613 (7th Cir. 1985). The court in South noted, however,
that a court has authority to modify such a time limit if circumstances have changed so that
enforcement of the time limit would be unjust and the plaintiffs show that the changed
circumstances were unforeseeable and extraordinary. Id. at 613-14.
14. See, e.g., Kendrick, 659 F. Supp. at 1191.
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low in deciding whether to release jurisdiction over consent decrees in
the absence of a date specified in the decree itself.I5 One possible
explanation is that the trend toward using consent decrees in structural reform litigation is relatively recent, and therefore issues that
concern the release of jurisdiction may only now be arising in any
significant numbers. Moreover, because parties to a consent decree
have agreed on the goals of the decree and the means for achieving
those goals, problems concerning compliance are less likely to arise
than between parties to litigated decrees.' 6 Thus jurisdiction may terminate by agreement in the usual case.
Judicially created standards for the release of jurisdiction over
litigated decrees, however, provide a useful analogy because similar
policies are at stake. First, just as parties to a litigated decree are
entitled to the vindication of their rights, parties to a consent decree
are entitled to the enforcement of their promises. Although a consent
decree is usually entered into without a finding of liability,' 7 it is both
a contract and an order; the agreement of the parties creates an expectation that they will receive the benefit of their bargain.' 8 This expectation interest is as much entitled to vindication as the rights under a
litigated decree. Second, the court has an interest in upholding its
authority to enforce its decrees without either becoming entangled in
the details of institutional administration or unduly prolonging its
involvement in the case. Much like a litigated decree, a consent
decree is an order that the court has approved and has undertaken to
enforce. Thus, the court's authority is equally at stake. At the same
time, however, federal courts must defer to state officials in the dayto-day administration of state programs and avoid entrapment in
detail that eventually can be overwhelming. ' 9
A third policy consideration for both litigated and consent
decrees is that the court in either case should be shielded from the
15. See, e.g., Vaughns v. Board of Educ., 574 F. Supp. 1280 (D. Md. 1983), aff'd in part,
rev'd in part, 758 F.2d 983 (4th Cir. 1985). Vaughns involved a 1974 school desegregation
consent decree where the court released jurisdiction soon thereafter without reporting its

reasons for doing so. Six years later, the parties were back in court. Id. at 1284-85. For a
discussion of resuming jurisdiction, see infra text accompanying notes 46-48.
16. For a discussion of the reasons for fewer compliance problems with consent decrees,
see Anderson, supra note 5, at 726-27.
17. In theory, plaintiffs could insist upon a clause in a consent decree whereby defendants
would admit to violating plaintiffs' rights. This is highly unusual in practice, however, because
one of the major incentives for defendants to agree to a settlement is to avoid the risk of being
found liable at trial. See Anderson, supra note 3, at 580-81.
18. Cf Local Number 93, Int'l Ass'n of Firefighters v. City of Cleveland, 106 S. Ct. 3063,
3074-77 (1986) (Consent decrees have a dual nature resembling both contracts and judgments,
and voluntary creation of enforceable obligations is their most fundamental characteristic.).
19. See Procunier v. Martinez, 416 U.S. 396, 404-05 (1974).
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burden of renewed litigation that would result from a premature
release of jurisdiction.2 ° One important difference between consent
decrees and litigated decrees is that there is a greater likelihood of
cooperation and voluntary compliance with a consent decree because
it is entered into by agreement rather than coercion. Once defendants
have performed the entire agreement, it is less likely that they will slip
back into a state of noncompliance than if a court had coerced them
into compliance. The court can thus release jurisdiction of a consent
decree, confident that the parties will not return to court in the future.
Because there are instances of widespread noncompliance with some
consent decrees, 2' however, courts must still consider the potential for
future noncompliance and the risk of renewed litigation.
A two-pronged test for determining whether to release jurisdiction over consent decrees captures the concerns of these three policies.
A motion to release jurisdiction would be filed initially by the defendant with the trial court of original jurisdiction. Thus, the trial court
would apply this test in deciding whether to grant the motion. First,
the defendants must prove that they have substantially complied with
the requirements of the decree; neither good faith attempts to comply
nor progress toward achieving the goals of the decree would suffice.2 2
Second, if the defendants have proved substantial compliance, the
court must release jurisdiction, unless there is a strong likelihood that
the defendants will violate the decree in the future. The two elements
of this test will be discussed in order.
A.

Substantial Compliance

In analyzing "substantial compliance," the interests of the par20. Even after the court has released jurisdiction, the obligations in a consent decree
remain in force and plaintiffs can still seek to either reopen the original case or bring a new
suit, claiming violations of the consent decree. See infra text accompanying notes 46-61.
21. See, e.g., Duran v. Elrod, 713 F.2d 292 (7th Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 465 U.S. 1108
(1984) (substantial noncompliance with consent decree to improve jail conditions); New York
State Ass'n for Retarded Children v. Carey, 706 F.2d 956 (2d Cir. 1983) (noncompliance with
decree promising the relocation of mentally retarded persons from a large institution to
community-based homes, and improvements in the institution for those residents who remain);
Morris v. Travisono, 509 F.2d 1358 (1st Cir. 1975) (unilateral disregard of procedural
safeguards for classifying and disciplining prisoners); United States v. Board of Educ., 567 F.
Supp. 272 (N.D. Il1. 1983), aff'd in part, vacated in part, 717 F.2d 378 (7th Cir. 1983) (failure
to provide assistance in desegregating Chicago schools); Inmates of Boys' Training School v.
Southworth, 76 F.R.D. 115 (D.R.I. 1977) (widespread failure to improve living conditions and
treatment program in a juvenile reformatory).
22. See Finney v. Arkansas Bd. of Correction, 505 F.2d 194, 199-200 (8th Cir. 1974); cf.
Morgan v. McDonough, 689 F.2d 265, 268-72, 274-75 (1st Cir. 1982) (Despite school officials'
good faith efforts to comply with the desegregation order, the court denied their motion to
terminate jurisdiction.).
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ties and the court must be considered. The defendant has a duty to
perform the requirements of, and achieve the goals mandated by, a
judicial decree, and the plaintiff has an interest in obtaining the benefits afforded by the decree. Because the court has an interest in retaining authority to enforce its decree, it must determine whether a
defendant has complied fully with the entire decree in deciding
whether to release jurisdiction.2 3
It is unrealistic, however, to expect absolute perfection in the performance of every obligation. Complex decrees that require extensive
reform of institutions or bureaucratic policies24 contain many different tasks that will require a period of time to implement. Some tasks
may be easy to perform, others may be difficult, and a few may prove
to be impracticable. Thus patience is required, and the possiblity that
decrees will have to be modified always exists. If a court required
perfect compliance before it would release jurisdiction, judicial supervision would become permanent and the court would waste its
resources on day-to-day administration.25
Substantial compliance rather than perfection is therefore an appropriate standard in deciding whether to release jurisdiction. Under
this standard, the degree of compliance mandated varies according to
the different provisions of the decree. The court is in a position to
23. In Finney v. Arkansas Bd. of Correction, 505 F.2d 194 (8th Cir. 1974), the court
stated:
The fact that assaults and physical injuries have diminished does not demonstrate
compliance with the court's decree of four years ago. The fact that there is some
compliance is not good enough. As long as barracks are used respondents must
assure that they are not overcrowded and are safe and sanitary for every inmate.
Id. at 201; see also Raney v. Board of Educ., 391 U.S. 443, 449 (1968) (district court should
"retain jurisdiction [in school desegregation cases] until it is clear that disestablishment has
been achieved"); Morgan v. McDonough, 689 F.2d 265, 280 (1st Cir. 1982) (district court
should determine whether defendants accomplished "maximum" compliance); Mapp v. Board
of Educ., 630 F. Supp. 876, 888 (E.D. Tenn. 1986) (district court will retain jurisdiction until
satisfied that desegregation plan has been implemented).
In contrast, the court in Burks v. Teasdale, 603 F.2d 59 (8th Cir. 1979), may have
endorsed a more lenient approach when it stated: "As indicated, the district court has retained
jurisdiction of the case. That course is proper, and jurisdiction should be retained until the
district court is satisfied that unconstitutionalities in the Penitentiary have been eliminated or
until their elimination within a relatively short future period is assured." Id. at 62 (emphasis
added). To this extent, the dictum indicates that the district court may release jurisdiction
before compliance has been achieved. The case sets up an inappropriate standard because
defendants may lose their incentive to complete the job, or unforeseen obstacles may arise. A
release of jurisdiction based upon an inherently uncertain prediction of future events could be
premature, resulting in the burden of reopening the case.
24. Complex decrees serve as guides for bureaucratic reform. See Chayes, The Role of the
Judge in Public Law Litigation, 89 HARV. L. REV. 1281, 1284 (1976); Fiss, The Supreme Court
1978 Term, Foreward." The Forms of Justice, 93 HARV. L. REV. 1, 48-49 (1979).
25. See, e.g., Taylor v. Sterrett, 600 F.2d 1135, 1141-45 (5th Cir. 1979) (Enforcing absolute
compliance entangles the court in administrative details of running the county jails.).
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consider, with regard to each requirement of the decree, the interest at
stake, the degree to which that interest is harmed by noncompliance,
and the feasibility of achieving total compliance.2 6 In some instances,
the interest may be so vital that the court insists upon strict compliance with provisions affecting that interest; even good faith efforts
resulting in only occasional violations will not suffice to constitute
substantial compliance. 27 Other interests may be less vital or occasional violations may be impossible to erase completely despite a
defendant's best efforts. In such a situation, the court will tolerate a
small margin of error, and remain confident that defendants are willing to comply with their obligations to the best of their ability.28
It is important, however, to recognize one critical difference
between applying the substantial compliance standard to consent
decrees rather than litigation decrees. If the parties to a lawsuit go to
trial, and the court finds the defendant in violation of the applicable
law and accordingly enters a decree designed to remedy that violation, the court must release its jurisdiction if the defendant shows
compliance with the law upon which the decree was based. 29 A consent decree, on the other hand, is not the product of a trial on the
merits, but a voluntary agreement entered into by the parties:
Indeed, it is the parties' agreement that serves as the source of the
26. See
Cir. 1982);
Morgan set
jurisdiction

Fortin v. Commissioner of Mass. Dep't of Pub. Welfare, 692 F.2d 790, 795 (1st
see also Morgan v. McDonough, 689 F.2d 265 (1st Cir. 1982). The court in
forth standards for deciding whether to grant an anticipated motion to terminate
over student assignment portions of the long-running Boston school desegregation

decree:
When hearings are held on that issue, the court should determine whether
defendants are acting in good faith respecting assignments and whether
compliance by defendants with the various court-mandated assignment remedies
in this case has accomplished "maximum practicable desegregation" and brought
an end to state-imposed segregation.
Id. at 280 (citations ommitted).
27. See, e.g., Taylor v. Perini, 421 F. Supp. 740, 756 (N.D. Ohio 1976). In Perini, the
court confirmed a recommendation of a special master to continue jurisdiction over jail
disciplinary procedures required by a consent decree, even though the defendants were making
a good faith attempt to comply and every reasonable effort to avoid occasional violations.
28. See id. at 745-46; see also Kendrick v. Bland, 659 F. Supp. 1188 (W.D. Ky. 1987). In
Kendrick, prisoners complained of unsanitary conditions in food service, violations of state
health codes, and generally unsanitary conditions. Id. at 1192. Although the court found that
there were sanitation problems, it stressed that perfect compliance was not realistic. The
defendants would therefore be considered to be in compliance as long as both parties
cooperated to strive for perfection. Id. at 1194.
29. See Taylor v. Sterrett, 600 F.2d 1135, 1141 (5th Cir. 1979) (Texas statutes and
regulations governing jail conditions); Finney v. Arkansas Bd. of Correction, 505 F.2d 194,
198-99, 216 (8th Cir. 1974) (eighth amendment ban on cruel and unusual punishment); Smith
v. Sullivan, 611 F.2d 1039, 1046 (5th Cir. 1980) ("The court should continue to exercise its
jurisdiction only if and to the extent that it determines that there are continuing deprivations
of federal constitutional dimensions.").
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court's authority to enter any judgment at all. More importantly,
it is the agreement of the parties, rather than the force of the law
upon which the complaint was originally based, that creates the
obligations embodied in a consent decree.3"

It is inadequate, therefore, for the defendant simply to show compliance with the underlying law. The court must determine whether the
defendant's actions have satisfied the intent of the parties at the time
they entered into the decree. 3' If the requirements of the consent
decree are more stringent than, but not in violation of, the underlying
law, then the defendant must perform at the higher level mandated by
the agreement in order to achieve substantial compliance.
B.

The Likelihood of Future Violations

Once a defendant establishes substantial compliance with the
decree, the court must determine the likelihood of future violations
before releasing jurisdiction.32 Although prediction of the future is
always risky, several policies underscore the importance of making an
educated guess about the future course of events. First, in both litigated and consent decrees, courts attempt to create lasting solutions
to problems that have resulted from years of institutional neglect and
inertia. The prisons, mental hospitals, and other institutions that are
the subject of structural reform decrees will continue to function long
after the lawsuits have ended. The courts therefore have an interest in
30. Local Number 93, Int'l Ass'n of Firefighters v. City of Cleveland, 106 S. Ct. 3063,
3076 (1986) (citations omitted).
31. Kendrick, 659 F. Supp. at 1192. In this regard, the parties may disagree on the
meaning of particular provisions of the decree. In such a situation, the judge will have to
interpret the decree as an initial step in deciding whether defendants have achieved substantial
compliance. See, e.g., id. at 1191-92. For a discussion of the standards courts should use in
interpreting consent decrees, see Anderson, supra note 3, at 622-32.
32. Lovell v. Brennan, 728 F.2d 560, 564 (1st Cir. 1984); Battle v. Anderson, 708 F.2d
1523, 1537, 1539 (10th Cir. 1983), cert. dismissed, 465 U.S. 1014 (1984); Keyes v. School Dist.
Number One, 609 F. Supp. 1491, 1514 (D. Colo. 1985).
It is not always clear, however, whether a court has considered the possibility of future
violations in deciding to release jurisdiction. In Taylor v. Sterrett, 600 F.2d 1135 (5th Cir.
1979), it appears that the appellate court directed the district court to release jurisdiction
because the defendants were presently in substantial compliance with the law, without
consideration of potential future violations. Id. at 1141. A closer examination of the opinion,
however, reveals that the court considered the fact that Texas had created a commission to
monitor and enforce jail standards in the future: "The establishment of this body indicates a
strong state commitment to improving conditions in those jails and, coupled with the fact that
this case involves no federal constitutional violations, creates an especially compelling need for
federal judicial 'deference to the appropriate prison authorities.' " Id. at 1145 (citation
omitted). It is at least implicit in Sterrett that one factor in deciding whether to release
jurisdiction is whether defendants have provided protection against future violations. See also
Finney v. Arkansas Bd. of Correction, 505 F.2d 194, 206 (8th Cir. 1974) (district court should
retain jurisdiction to provide continuing protection against cruel and inhumane treatment).
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fashioning remedies that will have a permanent effect on the way
these institutions function. A release of jurisdiction over an institution or bureaucracy presently in compliance may be followed by a
return to noncompliance, which harms the plaintiffs and eventually
leads to renewed litigation.3 3 Second, the failure to retain juridiction
when noncompliance is likely to recur places an unnecessary burden
on the plaintiffs to institute new proceedings in the event that viola34
tions do occur.

Third, the very nature of remedies in equity requires consideration of the future. A plaintiff is entitled to injunctive relief upon proof
of a "real threat of future violations." 35 Structural reform litigation in
particular focuses not only on the future, but on social conditions that
threaten constitutional values. Thus a judicial remedy must be designed to eliminate the threat of future violations and achieve permanent change.3 6 Moreover, courts of equity traditionally have had the
power to ensure that their decrees will be effective in the future and
that they will not be defeated by defendants who make temporary
changes to satisfy the court and resume their prior behavior after the
court has released jurisdiction.3" For these reasons, a court of equity
ought to retain jurisdiction to supervise the implementation of its
33. See Taylor v. Perini, 421 F. Supp. 740 (N.D. Ohio 1976). In Perini,the court required
the establishment of an independent jail grievance system as a prerequisite to release of
jurisdiction: "Indeed, in the absence of such a system, a release of jurisdiction by the Court is
likely to result in slippage which over the course of time may lead to new litigation... " Id.
at 743. For a discussion of renewed litigation and resumption of jurisdiction, see infra text
accompanying notes 41-56.
34. See Lovell v. Brennan, 728 F.2d 560 (1st Cir. 1984). In Lovell, inmates claimed that
conditions at Maine State Prison violated both the federal Constitution and the provisions of
an earlier consent decree. After the inmates filed the complaint, the defendants instituted
improvements at the prison to cure the violations. At trial, however, the plaintiffs contended
that the likelihood of recurring violations was sufficient to require injunctive relief. The
district court granted partial relief, and the plaintiffs appealed the portion of the order denying
relief. Id. at 561-62. The Court of Appeals stated:
In these circumstances, the court could have retained jurisdiction of the case to
monitor conditions at the prison if it found a likelihood that the constitutional
rights of the plaintiffs would be violated in the near future. Such a procedure
would have "relieve[d] plaintiffs of the considerable burden and delay of
initiating new proceedings" in the event of future violations. On the other hand,
dismissal was proper if the lower court found no present violations and thought
that there was no likelihood of violations in the near future.
Id. at 564 (citations omitted); see also Campbell v. McGruder, 580 F.2d 521, 541, 543 (D.C.
Cir. 1978) (district court has discretion to determine whether violations are likely to recur).
35. See United States v. Oregon State Medical Soc'y, 343 U.S. 326, 333 (1952).
36. See Keyes, 609 F. Supp. at 1506.
37. See Oregon State Medical Soc'y, 343 U.S. at 333; Battle v. Anderson, 708 F.2d 1523,
1538-39 (10th Cir. 1983), cert. dismissed, 465 U.S. 1014 (1984).
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decree until it is satisfied that the changes mandated by the decree
have become permanent.
The standard utilized by courts in determining the likelihood of
future violations involves the analysis of two factors: The defendants'
past record of compliance and their present attitudes toward the
reforms mandated by the decree."a If a defendant has been guilty of
repeated instances of noncompliance and has only recently cured
those violations, there would be reason to doubt that the change in
behavior is permanent. Conversely, a defendant who has a consistent
record of obeying the decree to the best of his ability is not likely to
become uncooperative simply because the court releases jurisdiction. 9
Present attitudes are determined from statements made by the defendants themselves. Expressions of good faith intent to maintain the
reforms, while not to be taken at face value, afford some basis for
confidence in the future. 40 Statements that signify hostile or indifferent attitudes, on the other hand, indicate that the defendants are presently complying with the decree only because the court is requiring
them to do so. In these instances, the court should be skeptical about
future compliance.
Although past records and present attitudes will aid the court in
assessing the likelihood of future violations, they will not yield certain
conclusions. Ultimately, the battle over jurisdiction could depend on
which party has the burden of proof. If the defendant has committed
only isolated violations of the consent decree, the court has a reasonably sound basis for predicting that the defendant will continue to
comply with its obligations. In that case, the plaintiff should bear the
burden of proving that future violations are likely.4 Conversely, if
the evidence shows a pattern of noncompliance in the past, or a series
of disputes that were resolved by the defendant reluctantly altering its
behavior, it is reasonable to presume that such conduct is likely to
return upon release of jurisdiction. Under those circumstances, the
38. See, e.g., Morgan v. McDonough, 689 F.2d 265, 280 (1st Cir. 1982).
39. Cf Spangler v. Pasadena City Bd. of Educ., 611 F.2d 1239, 1243-44 (9th Cir. 1979)
(Kennedy, J., concurring) (In light of nine years of substantial compliance with a school
desegregation decree, statements made by some school board members for a return to a
discriminatory neighborhood school policy did not support a finding of intent to
discriminate.).
40. See, e.g., Morgan, 689 F.2d at 280; Spangler, 611 F.2d at 1241. For a discussion of this
"attitude principle," see Note, Retention of Jurisdiction in Desegregation Cases. A Causal and
Attitudinal Analysis, 52 S. CAL. L. REV. 195 (1978).
41. Cf Spangler, 611 F.2d at 1241 (Unsubstantiated charges that the school board will
violate the order in the future is an insufficient basis for the court to assume permanent
jurisdiction, notwithstanding plaintiffs' claim that the board has the burden of proving that

releasing jurisdiction will not prejudice their interests.).
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burden should shift to the defendant to prove that there is no reasonable likelihood of future violations. 4 2 The defendant might, for example, establish an extrajudicial body to enforce the reforms made under
the decree,4 3 or the court itself could order the establishment of such a
body."
C.

The Scope of Appellate Review

Under the foregoing analysis, the trial court should release jurisdiction only if it determines that the defendant is in substantial compliance with the consent decree and that there is no reasonable
likelihood of future noncompliance. Because each of these determinations is a finding of fact, appellate review will be limited to whether
the trial judge's findings are clearly erroneous.4 5 The trial judge thus
42. See Battle v. Anderson, 708 F.2d 1523 (10th Cir. 1983). Although the Battle court
found that the conditions in the Oklahoma prison system were presently in compliance with
constitutional standards, it also recognized that the conditions were deteriorating. Id. at 1539.
The Court of Appeals concluded:
In light of its fully supported factual findings, the district court correctly chose to
exercise continuing jurisdiction in this controversy. Present compliance is
insufficient to bring an end to this litigation if the compliance is simply a
transient excursion above the constitutional threshold. The district court has not
only the authority but an obligation to prevent a regression of the Oklahoma
prison system to the unconstitutional conditions of the past. When a prison
system deteriorates to the point that a federal district court must step in to rectify
unconstitutional conditions, the court should retain jurisdiction until it is
satisfied that the unconstitutional conditions will not recur.
Id.; accord Campbell v. McGruder, 580 F.2d 521, 527 (D.C. Cir. 1978); cf United States v.
Concentrated Phosphate Export Ass'n, 393 U.S. 199, 203 (1968) (case is not moot unless the
defendant who previously had been found liable satisfies the heavy burden of showing that its
illegal conduct is not likely to recur).
43. In Taylor v. Sterrett, 600 F.2d 1135, 1145 (5th Cir. 1979), the court stressed that, in
addition to substantial compliance with state law, Texas created a commission to enforce jail
standards.
44. See, e.g., Taylor v. Perini, 431 F. Supp. 566, 567-68 (N.D. Ohio 1977). In Perini, the
district court ordered the establishment of a permanent external body to monitor the
defendants' grievance because widespread noncompliance with the consent decree in the past
showed a need for independent supervision: "In simplest terms, the problem may ultimately
reduce itself either to the independent monitoring group, or the necessity of the Court
retaining jurisdiction indefinitely." Id. at 568. The court also stated, "The only real remedy
that this Court can give in this case is to see to it that the defendants demonstrate their
compliance with [the consent decree] by adopting administrative procedures that will insure a
permanent change of old bad habits." Id. An analysis of the subsequent litigation in the
Perini case, however, indicates that although the defendants achieved substantial compliance
with the decree, the court still has not formally released jurisdiction. See Taylor v. Perini, 477
F. Supp. 1289 (N.D. Ohio 1979); Talyor v. Perini, 455 F. Supp. 1241 (N.D. Ohio 1977); Taylor
v. Perini, 446 F. Supp. 1184 (N.D. Ohio 1977).
45. Rule 52(a) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provides in part: "Findings of fact,
whether based on oral or documentary evidence, shall not be set aside unless clearly erroneous,
and due regard shall be given to the opportunity of the trial court to judge of the credibility of
the witnesses." For applications of this deferential standard, see Lovell v. Brennan, 728 F.2d
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will be the primary decisionmaker regarding the release of jurisdiction. On a practical level, this role is appropriate because the trial
judge has supervised the entire process of implementation and is in
the best position to determine whether he has done all in his power to
assure maximum compliance with the decree.

III.

RESUMPTION OF JURISDICTION

Even if the court has released jurisdiction, it is possible that the
court's prediction of the future will prove to be wrong and that the
defendants will nevertheless violate the decree. Because the structural
reforms mandated by a consent decree are intended to be permanent,
and the obligation to comply with the substantive provisions of the
decree continues even after the court has released jurisdiction,4 6 the
court has the authority to resume jurisdiction to enforce the decree.
Unlike dissolving an injunction, which terminates a defendant's duty
to obey the injunction in the future,4 7 the effect of releasing jurisdiction over a consent decree is simply to place the case on inactive status and end the court's supervision of the implementation process. 48
In practical terms, defendants no longer need to file reports or justify
their actions to the court; 49 they can make policy with the knowledge that a federal court will not scrutinize every detail.5" Similarly,
plaintiffs' attorneys will no longer be entitled to attorneys' fees for
monitoring compliance; they must seek to reopen the case and prove
that the defendants have regressed into a state of noncompliance.
There are two primary avenues available to plaintiffs for seeking
enforcement of a consent decree after the court has released jurisdiction: reopen the original case in which the decree was entered; or
560, 563-64 (1st Cir. 1984); Battle v. Anderson, 708 F.2d 1523, 1539-40 (10th Cir. 1983);
Finney v. Arkansas Bd. of Correction, 505 F.2d 194, 215 (8th Cir. 1974); cf. Fortin v.
Commissioner of Mass. Dep't of Pub. Welfare, 692 F.2d 790, 794 (Ist Cir. 1982) (applying
clearly erroneous standard in context of civil contempt motion). But cf. Bose Corp. v.
Consumers Union of United States, 466 U.S. 485, 510-11, 514 (1984) (Appellate courts must
make an independent examination of the record in cases raising first amendment issues,
particularly the "actual malice" standard in libel cases, in order to ensure that the judgment
does not intrude upon free expression.). See generally Pullman-Standard v. Swint, 456 U.S.
273 (1982); United States v. United States Gypsum Co., 333 U.S. 364 (1948).
46. Vaughns v. Board of Educ., 758 F.2d 983, 988-89 (4th Cir. 1985); Taylor v. Perini, 431
F. Supp. 566, 568 (N.D. Ohio 1977).
47. See, e.g., Fortin, 692 F.2d at 800 n.13; Tobin v. Alma Mills, 192 F.2d 133, 136 (4th
Cir. 1951). But cf SEC v. Warren, 583 F.2d 115, 121 (3d Cir. 1978) (holding that when an
injunction requires defendants merely "to obey the law," defendants must still comply upon
dissolution).
48. See, e.g., Spangler v. Pasadena City Bd. of Educ., 519 F.2d 430, 431 n.l, 438 n.10 (9th
Cir. 1975), vacated, 427 U.S. 424 (1976).
49. Vaughns, 758 F.2d at 989.
50. See Spangler v. Pasadena City Bd. of Educ., 611 F.2d 1239, 1242 (9th Cir. 1979).
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file a new lawsuit as beneficiaries of a consent decree, claiming that
the defendants are violating its terms.
A.

Reopening the Original Case

The trial court has authority, upon the motion of a party to the
original decree, to reopen a case in order to remedy actual or imminent material violations of all or part of a consent decree. Reopening
a case requires a careful balancing of the need to protect hard-won
benefits against the interest in the finality of litigation. These competing policies of fairness and efficiency require a flexible approach to
reopening a case in which a consent decree was entered. If the violations involve only a portion of the decree, for example, the court's
authority is flexible enough to permit resuming jurisdiction only over
that portion. This flexibility is demonstrated in Vaughns v. Board of
Education of Prince George's County,"' in which the defendants
agreed to desegregate their schools under a consent decree. Six years
after the trial court had relinquished jurisdiction, the plaintiffs moved
to reopen the case, claiming that the defendants had both violated the
consent decree and failed to achieve a desegregated school system.
The court found that, with respect to most areas of school administration covered by the decree, the defendants had attempted in good
faith to comply: although they had not yet met the goals of the
decree, they had performed to the extent possible. The plaintiffs were
therefore not entitled to a reopening of these aspects of the decree.52
The court also found that the defendants had eliminated some of the
student transportation required by the consent decree without seeking
court permission, thereby contributing to further racial imbalance in
the schools. Thus, the court concluded that the plaintiffs were entitled to a reopening of the requisite student transportation portion of
the decree. 3
The Vaughns standard for resuming jurisdiction is one of substantial noncompliance. The obligation to perform continues after the
court has relinquished jurisdiction, but isolated violations or even failure to maintain the goals of the decree are not sufficient to justify
reopening the case. In addition to violating the decree, the defendants
must have failed to take all feasible measures to maintain the mandated reforms. The court in Vaughns found substantial noncompli51. 574 F. Supp. 1280 (D. Md. 1983), aff'd in part, rev'd in part, 758 F.2d 983 (4th Cir.
1985).

52. Id. at 1290-92, 1307. For example, the district court found no evidence of racial
discrimination in the hiring of new faculty. Id. at 1295.
53. Id. at 1337-71.
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ance in one area of the decree and adopted the flexible approach of a
partial reopening limited to that area. This strategy is effective in protecting plaintiffs' interests and allowing the court to make efficient use
of its resources.
B.

Filing a New Suit

In requesting the court to reopen the original case, plaintiffs may
not raise claims that are beyond the scope of the consent decree.54 If
plaintiffs claim that the provisions of an earlier consent decree have
been violated, but also seek to raise new and separate claims that were
not addressed in the earlier decree, the proper procedure is to file a
new suit. This procedure was followed in Lovell v. Brennan.5 5 In
Lovell, state prison inmates falling within three classes-administrative segregation, general population, and protective custody-brought
a class action against the governor of Maine and other state officials.
The class of inmates in administrative segregation claimed that the
procedures for assigning inmates to segregation violated both the provisions of an earlier consent decree and the due process clause of the
fourteenth amendment.5 6 In addition, however, the inmates made
new and independent claims that went far beyond the scope of the
earlier consent decree. Inmates within all three classes alleged, for
example, that their living conditions violated the eighth and fourteenth amendments, as well as state law. 7 With one exception, the
court reached the merits of all the claims, ruling that the defendants
54. See, e.g., Coca-Cola Bottling Co. v. Coca-Cola Co., 98 F.R.D. 254 (D. Del. 1983).
Coca-Cola Bottling Co. was a complex case in which bottlers of Coca-Cola sued the
manufacturer, alleging three separate claims: (1) Violation of a 1921 consent decree;
(2) breach of contract; and (3) unjust enrichment. Id. at 261-62. One bottling company also
moved separately to reopen the original 1921 case by filing a supplemental complaint in the
original case, alleging the same three claims. Id. at 257-58. The court in this separate action
held that the new contract and unjust enrichment claims could not be raised in the original
action, but must instead be raised in the new lawsuit. Id. at 275-76. With respect to this
bottler's claim relating to the consent decree, the court held that it had discretion to permit
this claim to be raised in the original action, but to do so would unduly complicate the original
case. The court concluded that this bottler's rights would be protected in the new suit and
thus denied permission to reopen the original action and granted permission to the bottler to
intervene in the new suit. Id. at 276.
55. 566 F. Supp. 672 (D. Me. 1983), aff'd, 728 F.2d 560 (1st Cir. 1984).
56. Id. at 676, 694.
57. Id. The other new, nonconsent decree claims were as follows: The inmates in
protective custody claimed that the procedures for assigning them to protective custody
violated the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment; both the inmates in
administrative segregation and protective custody alleged that they received fewer programs
than the general populalion, in violation of the equal protection clause, and that their sixth
amendment right of access to the courts had been denied; finally, all three classes claimed that
the defendants' use of "restraint cells" violated the eighth and fourteenth amendments.
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had failed to comply with the administrative segregation procedures
mandated in the earlier consent decree and that the use of "restraint
cells" violated the eighth amendment, but that plaintiffs failed to
prove any other consitutional violations." Thus Lovell is an example
of a new lawsuit in which plaintiffs, while claiming that the defendants had violated an earlier consent decree, also raised new and separate claims that the defendants had violated other legal rights.59
If the plaintiffs in a new action prove that the defendant either is
presently failing to comply or will likely violate the decree in the near
future, they are entitled to relief and the resumption of jurisdiction. 60
If the defendant is on the verge of violating the decree, the resumption
of jurisdiction will enable the court to prevent further noncompliance
and damage, to assure that the previous reforms are permanent, and
to protect the traditional authority of equity courts to enforce their
decrees. 6'
IV.

CONCLUSION

Over the past thirty years, many litigants have entered into structural reform consent decrees. As these decrees mature, the parties
will not always agree as to whether implementation has been completed. As a result, judges will be faced with the issue of whether to
release jurisdiction. The crucial question in each case is whether the
defendants have achieved reform that is both complete for the present
and permanent for the future. The courts should not release jurisdic58. The one exception was the claim that the procedures for assigning inmates to
administrative segregation violated due process. The court found it unnecessary to decide this
claim because it found that such procedures violated the earlier consent decree. Id. at 694.
This suggests that if a plaintiff claims that a defendant's actions violate an earlier consent
decree and the only additional claim is that those same actions also violate other rights (such
as due process), the prudent procedure for the plaintiff would be to move to reopen the original
action in which the consent decree was entered. If the court rules for the plaintiff on the
consent decree claim, it will be unnecessary to reach the other claim. If the court rules against
plaintiff on the consent decree claim, it is likely the the court will then find the other claim
barred by the doctrine of res judicata. Compare Pension v. Terminal Transp. Co., 634 F.2d
989 (5th Cir. Unit B 1981) (consent decree not given res judicata effect because notice to class
was inadequate) with Fowler v. Birmingham News Co., 608 F.2d 1055 (5th Cir. 1979) (valid
class action consent decrees are generally accorded res judicata effect).
59. An earlier civil rights consent decree can be enforced in a new suit both by the
plaintiffs in the original suit and also by persons who were not parties to the earlier suit, but
are intended beneficiaries of the earlier decree. See, e.g., Virgo v. Local Union 580, 107 F.R.D.
84, 92 (S.D.N.Y. 1985).
60. See Lovell, 728 F.2d at 564. The court concluded, however, that the plaintiffs had
failed to prove either present or imminent violation. Id.
61. Whether there is an actual threat of noncompliance is a question of fact. Because the
trial judge's finding is reversible on appeal only if it is clearly erroneous, the judge is the
primary arbiter of whether jurisdiction is to resume. See supra note 45 and accompanying text.
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tion solely because the defendants have made progress or have exhibited a good faith commitment to implementing the decree. Active
supervision should cease only if the defendants have complied with
the decree to the best of their ability and there is no reasonable likelihood of future violation. Judges should not demand perfection, but
should demand substantial compliance.
Some tasks that are required by a complex consent decree may
prove more feasible than others. A standard of substantial compliance is adaptable to the needs of different provisions of a consent
decree. It may require strict compliance with some provisions, while
excusing occasional violations of other provisions. This adaptability
suggests that judges can adopt a flexible strategy of phased withdrawal of jurisdiction. The strategy would consist of a series of partial releases of jurisdiction over areas in which the defendants have
achieved substantial compliance, while retaining jurisdiction over
areas in which further reform is still feasible. The court could then
concentrate its efforts on the remaining areas. The same strategy
could be adopted for resumption of jurisdiction: resuming supervision only over the particular aspects in which the defendants have
returned to substantial noncompliance. This strategy would afford
judges the flexibility needed to preserve their limited resources, while
assuring performance of the promises made in the consent decrees.

